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ABSTRACT  
Direct democracy exhibits both promise and peril for the EU.  The referendum has been 
deployed by states in a way that has shaped and will continue to shape the EU’s geographical 
boundaries, its constitutional evolution, and salient EU policy matters.  The referendum’s 
promise is to accord a high degree of legitimacy to a political decision, but that promise 
varies across different types of EU referendum. Their peril for the EU has become 
increasingly apparent as they have proliferated in number and type and with a growing failure 
rate. In contrast the European Citizens’ Initiative is intended to harness the promise of direct 
democracy for the EU. But current practice raises the question of whether the failure to satisfy 
the ambitions placed on this novel instrument could, paradoxically, become a source of peril. 
Contrary to an increasingly pessimistic narrative, it is concluded that practice under the ECI 
exhibits promise and that the future of this instruments appears bright. 
Keywords: Direct democracy, EU referendums, treaty revision referendum, membership 
referendum, policy referendum, European Citizens’ Initiative. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The EU has had a turbulent relationship with direct democracy and in particular with 
the referendum. Although the EU cannot hold referendums, it has been the object of more 
than 50 as states, for the most part, have deployed this most well-known instrument of direct 
democracy to determine, amongst other things, whether they should join this organisation, 
whether they should leave it, whether other states should be allowed to join, whether they 
should agree to a revision to its founding treaties, whether they should join the single 
currency, or whether they should ratify agreements concluded by the EU with another 
country.  In terms of maximising popular sovereignty the promise of a referendum when 
appropriately configured is to accord the highest degree of endorsement and legitimacy to a 
political decision. Given the type of political system the EU has evolved into, a referendum 
on joining the EU is surely the most apt device for delivering accession to the EU. Much the 
same could be said for adopting the Euro. But the referendum tool can be a perilous 
endeavour, especially in the EU. Popular votes have famously brought the EU’s treaty 
revision process grinding to a halt on four different occasions and, most recently, have placed 
the EU in the wholly unprecedented position of dealing with a Member State (the UK) whose 
electorate have voted to leave.  
Although it is possible to pose multi-option referendums, as has been the case for 
many sovereignty referendums,1 to date all EU referendums have followed a binary nature. 
Since a referendum involves a change to the status quo, a pro-EU position usually takes the 
form of a Yes vote. However, it need not take this form. The pro-EU position in two recent 
EU referendums – Hungary's refugee quota referendum of 2016 and Greece's 2015 bailout 
referendum – was a No vote. Exceptionally, a referendum may not even be framed in terms of 
Yes vs. No as was the case with the UK's 2016 EU membership referendum where the pro-
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EU position took the form of a Remain vote. Rejecting the pro-EU position can involve 
differing degrees of peril for the EU. In some cases, such as treaty revision, a national 
referendum on an EU matter in one member state can have a direct extraterritorial impact on 
the rest of the Union. In other referendums, such as joining the EU or adopting the euro for 
that matter, rejecting the pro-EU position could even be a promising result not only for the 
state holding the vote but also, paradoxically, for the EU too. Teasing out some of these 
diverging implications of EU related referendums is a core concern in this paper 
One of the reasons for the increased scholarly attention devoted to EU referendums is 
the growing difficulty of delivering pro-EU outcomes among the different types of 
referendums held on EU matters. This growing failure rate can be seen in Figure 1, which 
plots the ‘Yes’ vote share for all EU-related referendums over time grouped by their type (see 
discussion on referendum types below). 2 The 50 per cent pass threshold is depicted by the 
dashed horizontal line. The plot shows quite clearly that the number of cases failing to cross 
the pass threshold begins to increase since the 2000s. Evidently, this is connected to the fact 
that there is also greater referendum activity in the post-2000 phase of European integration. 
Nonetheless, the difference is substantial. Before the 2000s, a period that was mostly 
characterised by what political scientists have referred to as a 'permissive consensus', 3 the 
failure rate for EU referendums was actually 20 per cent. As we move into the post-2000 
phase of European integration, now characterised as a ‘constraining dissensus’,4 the failure 
rate almost doubles to nearly 40 per cent. Since 2010 the failure rate has jumped to over 60 
per cent. As the EU has become more politicised there has been a corresponding increase in 
the failure to deliver pro-EU outcomes via the referendum device.  
 
Figure 1: ‘Yes’ vote by referendum type over time  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As more and different types of referendums have been deployed, and their peril for the EU 
has become more obvious in light of their increasing failure rate, the EU referendum 
phenomenon has generated growing scholarly attention. Political scientists and lawyers in 
particular have grappled with a range of questions that have included why such referendums 
are called, how they can be avoided, whether they can be legally challenged, the impact they 
have on the EU’s constitutional evolution, what role political parties play, how campaigning 
and turnout affect outcomes, and how voters make their decisions.5 
One line of enquiry has focussed on the call for the EU to harness the potential 
promise of direct democracy by deploying such instruments at EU level. Many of these 
proposals have concerned EU-wide referendums primarily either for a new founding or for 
treaty revisions. When wedded to unanimous ratification we suggest that such proposals offer 
more peril than promise. Where they propose surmounting the unanimity hurdle via some 
form of double majority the promise becomes greater, albeit not without peril, but the 
political feasibility is absent. Some potential promise of direct democracy has however been 
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harnessed by the inclusion of an EU level agenda initiative, the European Citizens’ Initiative 
(ECI), in the Lisbon Treaty. Agenda initiatives are a less well-known tool of direct democracy 
that allows citizens to request legislative action following a signature gathering exercise. 
Their origins are usually attributed to an EU Member State, Austria, which first made 
constitutional provision for them in 1920.6 They now exist in mostly European states, a range 
of Latin American states and some African and Asian countries.7 The literature generally 
points to agenda initiatives having limited policy impact and rarely leading to legislative 
action; 8  one reason perhaps why this more limited direct democratic instrument was 
acceptable at EU level, along with the fact that it was not a wholly foreign democratic 
innovation as agenda initiatives exist in various EU Member States. Realising the ECI’s 
potential promise, in terms of creating enhanced channels for direct participation on EU 
matters and increased policy responsiveness, would depend heavily on institutional design 
and political practice.  However, the ECI’s design and political practice are generating 
concerns that the promise is becoming illusory thus exacerbating popular discontent with the 
EU rather than alleviating it. In other words, that the ECI’s promise may be giving way to 
peril for the EU. We suggest a more positive account of the ECI’s design and more 
importantly of existing practice, to which the EU courts have already made a valuable 
contribution. The ECI’s future is bright precisely because it is housed in a political system 
that has much to gain from unleashing its democratic promise. In contrast the praxis of 
national and sub-national EU referendums, albeit subject to variation relating to the diverse 
properties of such referendums, has arguably given rise to much more peril than promise for 
the EU. With a view to exploring these contrasts, this article is divided into two main parts. 
The first assesses both the practice pertaining to referendums on EU matters and proposals for 
using EU-wide referendums. The second assesses the ECI, including choices made at its birth, 
the outcomes from its first years in operation and its potential future. The concluding section 
then wraps up some of the main arguments relating to the dualism in outcomes pertaining to 
these two instruments of direct democracy practiced on EU matters. 
	  
II.	  REFERENDUMS	  ON	  EU	  MATTERS:	  MORE	  PERIL	  THAN	  PROMISE?	  	  
This part is structured around an assessment of the practice, and the promise and perils, of the 
three main categories of EU referendums: membership referendums, treaty revision 
referendums and policy referendums.9 A final sub-section assesses growing calls for use of 
EU-wide treaty revision referendums.  
A. Membership referendums  
 
Membership referendums account for the majority of EU referendums and those which most 
often pass. They take two distinct forms, an accession referendum or a withdrawal 
referendum and we explore each in turn.  
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  Prior	   to	   the	  Austrian	   variant,	   an	   alternative	   initiative	  model	  which	   can	   generate	   a	   referendum	  where	   the	   legislature	  
rejects	  the	  proposed	  initiative	  was	  introduced	  in	  some	  US	  states	  and	  the	  1919	  Weimar	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  see	  V	  Cuesta-López,	  
Participación	  Directa	  e	  Iniciativa	  Legislativa	  del	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  en	  Democracia	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  Direct	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  (2008),	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  See e.g. M Setälä and T Schiller (eds) Citizens’ Initiatives in Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); O J Suárez Antón, La 
Iniciativa de Agenda en América Latina y La Unión Europea (PhD thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2017).  
9 We exclude a fourth category of referendums held on European integration by third countries that are neither EU member states 
nor candidate countries. See briefly on these referendums Mendez and Mendez note 2 above.   
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Table 1: Membership referendums  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE HERE  
 
The accession referendum is usually undertaken by candidate states on the negotiated 
accession treaty,10 and account for the vast majority (19 out of 22) of the membership 
referendums and all but two have passed (as Table 1 illustrates). No founding Member State 
put accession to the people.11 This is unsurprising for three reasons. Firstly, the constitutional 
significance of the organisation was not yet fully apparent. Secondly, the founding members, 
Belgium aside, had new constitutional clauses to legitimise the delegating of powers to 
international organisations. Thirdly, referendum practice was then largely non-existent. 
However, 16 of 22 candidate states have since put accession to popular approval. The 
accession referendum emerged with the first round of enlargement when three of the four 
candidate states held referendums on accession. The UK was the exception, but popular 
approval was forthcoming for continued membership only two years later (see further below). 
Norway is the only candidate state to have rejected accession, having done so in 1972 and 
again in 1994 when four other accession referendums delivered yes votes including the only 
sub-national accession referendum, by the Finnish Åland Islands, to have been held.  
A potential peril of accession referendums is that they reject the patiently negotiated 
accession agreement. But this is also part of their promise because it reduces the likelihood of 
a State joining the EU without popular support, something the EU can clearly do without.  
The referendum cannot be rivalled as a device for legitimising accession given the vast 
ramifications that now flow from EU membership, such as the obligation to join the Euro. It 
is thus unsurprising that constitutions have been amended to require an accession referendum 
(Hungary), or to provide for the possibility of such a referendum (Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden), and in some states (Austria and Finland) this has been the 
first national level referendum in generations.  Of the five candidate states not to have held an 
accession referendum since the first enlargement, three were recent military dictatorships 
(Greece, Spain and Portugal) joining prior to the integrationist steps of the Single European 
Act (SEA). The outliers are the recent entrants of Cyprus (2004) and Bulgaria (2007), though 
through to that point neither had held a referendum under their existing constitutional 
system.12 It has been suggested that the European Council could impose a referendum 
requirement as a condition of EU accession.13 This would seem an imposition too far and 
certainly could not be required for the actual accession agreement itself precisely because 
Article 49 TEU itself stipulates that the ‘agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all 
the contracting states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.’ In any 
event, with rare exception since the 1990s, the accession referendum has become the norm for 
legitimising accession. 
The withdrawal referendum accounts for three of 22 membership referendums. The 
UK has held two. First in 1975 when following renegotiations it held a referendum that 
delivered strong support for continued membership. Second, in 2016 when a Conservative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 We include Romania in the accession referendum category, but the referendum was actually on a substantial constitutional 
amendment to accommodate EU accession.  
11	  The Treaty of Rome stipulated that ratification was to be ‘in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’ 
(Article 247).   
12 Cyprus held its first national level referendum a week before it joined the EU.  
13	  A	  Auer  ‘National Referendums in the Process of European Integration: Time for Change’ in A Albi and J Ziller (eds), The 
European Constitution and National Constitutions: Ratifications and Beyond (Kluwer, 2007), 267, p. 269-70.  
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government fulfilled its manifesto commitment to hold an in-out EU referendum on 
renegotiated terms of membership with 51.9% voting to leave.  The UK’s second withdrawal 
referendum took place following the Lisbon Treaty’s inclusion of Article 50 TEU specifying 
that ‘[a]ny Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements.’ Normally states very rarely constitutionally require a 
referendum for treaty withdrawal, but the EU is no ordinary treaty. Moreover as so many 
states have held an accession referendum, and others have used a referendum to approve a 
treaty revision (eg, France, Spain and Luxembourg),14 it is highly unlikely that a different 
route would be used for the constitutionally momentous step of withdrawal. 
Given growing euroscepticism and populist parties seeking to exploit this, it may be 
that the UK’s 2016 referendum will not be the last Member State withdrawal referendum. 
There is an obvious peril dimension to Member State withdrawal referendums because they 
have destabilizing ramifications for the EU and all the more so when it is a State of the size 
and significance of the UK. A British ‘Remain’ vote, by contrast, might have brought some 
promise in terms of making the UK a less reluctant partner. A Brexit silver lining for the EU 
may be that it dampens demand for withdrawal referendums,15  and the willingness of 
politicians to call them unless they really do wish to leave the EU: as Prime Minister 
Cameron found out, there are no guaranteed outcomes when one calls such referendums and a 
comfortable poll lead can rapidly dissipate.  
The other express withdrawal referendum was held by Greenland, a constituent part 
of Denmark, and the nature of the peril for the EU here is incomparable to that of the Member 
State withdrawal referendum, precisely because the EU does not risk becoming one Member 
State smaller as a result.  Greenland voted overwhelmingly against joining in the 1972 Danish 
accession referendum and was granted a form of home rule by the late 1970s. In 1982 it held 
a consultative referendum in which a small majority approved of withdrawal. Following 
Greenland’s parliamentary approval, Denmark negotiated Greenland’s withdrawal, which 
took place in 1985.16  
An important challenge to the membership dynamic comes from independence 
referendums within Member States. The 2014 Scottish independence referendum is clearly 
distinct from a constituent part of a Member State, as with Greenland, voting expressly and 
exclusively on withdrawing from the EU.17 The Scottish-style referendum is not on an EU 
question as such. However, it has potentially significant ramifications for the EU as the 
would-be seceding entity wishes to remain within the EU. It was much debated whether a 
seamless internal EU enlargement was possible via the treaty revision procedure, 18  or 
arguably the more persuasive view, whether a seceding entity would need to apply to join. 19 
The ‘No’ vote on Scottish independence leaves this contentious question unanswered, but 
Catalonia’s on-going pursuit of secession from Spain ensures that it remains firmly on the 
table. The UK withdrawal referendum also raised the intriguing reverse question of whether a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Spain and Luxembourg only did so for the Constitutional Treaty. 
15 Early post-Brexit referendum polling has seen increased support for EU membership: see C	   de	   Vries	   and	   I	   Hoffman,	  
‘Supportive	   but	   wary.	   How	   Europeans	   feel	   about	   the	   EU	   60	   years	   after	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Rome’	   (2017)	   eupinions	  
BertelsmannStiftung	  Policy	  Paper	  2017/1.	   
16	   P Athanassiou	  and	  S	  Laulhé	  Shaelou,	  	  ‘EU	  Accession	  from	  Within?	  –	  An	  Introduction’	  (2014)	  33	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  
Law	  335. 
17	  On	  the	  Scottish	  referendum,	  see	  S	  Tierney,	  ‘The	  Scottish	  Independence	  Referendum:	  A	  Model	  of	  Good	  Practice	  in	  Direct	  
Democracy?’	  in	  S	  Ruth	  et	  al	  (eds)	  Let	  the	  people	  rule?	  Direct	  Democracy	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  (ECPR	  2016).	  	  
18	  S Douglas-Scott, ‘How easily could an independent Scotland join the EU?’ (2014) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper, No 
46/2014. 
19	  See K A Armstrong, ‘After “Ever Closer Union”: Negotiating Withdrawal, Secession, and Accession’ (2014) 37 Fordham 
International Law Journal 119; C Closa,  ‘Secession from a Member State and EU Membership: the View from the Union’ 
(2016) 12(2) European Constitutional Law Review 240.  
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constituent part of a Member State, Scotland, could remain in the EU while the larger 
political entity of it which it formed a part departed the EU.20  
	  
B.	  Treaty	  revision	  referendums	  	  	  	  
 
These are held by Member States as a precursor to ratifying a revision to the EU treaties and 
have been the second most common type of EU referendum.  Treaty revision referendums, 
and the complications to which they give rise, stem from the fact that for a treaty revision to 
enter into force the EU’s rules (currently Article 48 TEU) require ratification ‘by all the 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.’ If those 
domestic constitutional requirements are, or become, a referendum, then this becomes a 
prerequisite to treaty revision entering into force for the EU. 
 
Table 2: Treaty revision referendums  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
As Table 2 illustrates, all six main rounds of treaty revision, including the attempted 
revision via the Constitutional Treaty, have generated these referendums. Only six Member 
States have actually held them. Three (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain) did so only 
once, precisely for the only revision framed in bold constitutional language (the 
Constitutional Treaty).21 Most are accounted for by Denmark and Ireland.  The Danish 
Constitution’s transfer of powers clause (s20) stipulates a five-sixths parliamentary approval 
requirement, with popular approval required if only an ordinary parliamentary majority is 
obtained. However, the SEA did not fall within that clause. The first ever treaty revision 
referendum was actually Denmark’s non-constitutionally required consultative referendum on 
the SEA. The only other revising treaties to be subjected to Danish popular approval, 
Maastricht and Amsterdam, fell within the transfer of powers clause and referendums became 
constitutionally required as five-sixths majority approval was not forthcoming.22  
The Danish ‘No’ to Maastricht ratification in 1992 gave the EU its first experience 
with a negative popular vote bringing the treaty revision process to a halt and thus clearly 
demonstrating the peril for the EU of such referendums. European leaders agreed on a range 
of opt-outs so that Danish ratification could take place, as it did following popular approval in 
Denmark. The Danish ‘No’ also contributed to the French President calling a referendum on 
the Maastricht Treaty. This delivered the narrowest of margins in favour (51%) and is often 
viewed as signalling the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ on European integration.23 This 
vote sent a powerful message to political actors that the discretionary treaty revision 
referendum – i.e. one that is not constitutionally required – should be deployed with utmost 
caution for a yes vote could not even be guaranteed in a founding Member State with a 
generally favourable attitude towards European integration. This was made painfully clear 
when the Constitutional Treaty failed to surmount the referendums that political actors in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  See	  K	  A	  Armstrong,	  Brexit	  Time	  (Cambridge University Press, 2017), chapter 13. 	  
21 Use of constitutional challenges, the parliamentary process, and bottom-up mechanisms to try and generate such referendums  
have been a regular and growing occurrence across many Member States: see F Mendez et al, Referendums and the European 
Union  (Cambridge University Press, 2014), chapter 2.   
22 Referendums were not required nor held on Nice and Lisbon because they were found by the Ministry of Justice not to fall 
within the transfer of powers clause, see Mendez et al ibid, p 53-54. 
23 A term coined by Lindberg and Scheingold to refer to the state of public opinion on European integration:  L Lindberg and S 
Scheingold, Europe’s Would-be Polity (Prentice Hall, 1970).  
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France and the Netherlands decided to impose. Although discretionary referendums 
comfortably passed in Spain and Luxembourg, it seemed most unlikely that the Constitutional 
Treaty would have fared well in other states where referendums had been promised such as 
the UK. The popular votes on the Constitutional Treaty underlined the peril of treaty revision 
referendums in the post-permissive consensus era and gave rise to its demise and repackaging 
(the Lisbon Treaty). 
This brings us to Ireland, which, uniquely, has held a referendum on each major 
treaty revision that has come into force. This is owed to a constitutional challenge to the 
government’s attempt to ratify the SEA in which the Supreme Court ruled that EU revising 
treaties going beyond the scope or objectives of the existing treaties, as the SEA was 
considered to, would require a constitutional amendment and therefore a referendum.24 Since 
that ruling, Irish governments have put all main treaty revisions to a referendum.25 Negative 
votes on two occasions (Nice and Lisbon) brought the treaty revision process to a halt and led 
to European leaders giving Ireland various assurances that allowed for second referendums to 
take place. This ‘second referendum phenomenon’, whereby the people vote again following 
a negative vote illustrates another peril of referendums for the EU: it fuels euroscepticism.26 It 
has given rise to the damaging myth that Brussels will not take ‘no’ for an answer. This is 
most obviously incorrect in not distinguishing between different types of EU referendums. 
Thus, for example, Norway has not been forced to join the EU, nor was Greenland - nor is the 
UK - forced to remain. Moreover, even when focussing on the treaty revision referendums it 
should be underscored that certain relevant concerns were addressed to justify second 
referendums, and, on that basis, the Danish and Irish people turned out in larger numbers and 
voted comfortably in favour of the relevant treaties.  
Treaty revision referendums can certainly have redeeming features, particularly so 
where they are constitutionally mandatory or politically obligatory rather than discretionary 
devices.27 They are a powerful and salutary reminder to political elites that the treaty revision 
process must pay meaningful adherence to popular opinion. Indeed, it is part of their promise 
that they contribute to legitimising integrationist steps, particularly in those countries with 
stronger currents of euroscepticism. One could contrast Denmark, which has held 
referendums on three treaty revisions, and the UK, where none were held, and where such a 
referendum might have contributed to blunting the demands for the leave/remain referendum 
with the many negative consequences for the EU and UK that will flow from that leave vote.28  
However treaty revision referendums can be called for partisan gain, as was transparently the 
case with the French Maastricht referendum, and to bolster the negotiating positions of 
Member States during the treaty revision process.  And because every state has a ratification 
veto point there are serious questions about the legitimacy of the treaty revision process of an 
organisation with over 25 Members being held hostage to the outcome of a popular vote in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Crotty	  v.	  An	  Taoiseach	   [1987]	   1	   IR	   713. On which see G Barrett, ‘Building a Swiss Chalet in an Irish Legal Landscape? 
Referendums on European Union Treaties in Ireland and the Impact of Supreme Court Jurisprudence’ (2009) 5 European 
Constitutional Law Review 32.  
25  The small-scale Article 136 TFEU revision post-Lisbon, see note 32 below, saw the Irish government follow the Attorney 
General’s advice that it did not require a constitutional amendment referendum. 
26	  See G de Búrca, ‘If at First You Don’t Succeed: Vote, Vote Again: Analyzing the Second Referendum Phenomenon in EU 
Treaty Change’ (2011) 33 (5) Fordham International Law Journal 1472. 
27 Morel	  contrasts	  the	  democratic	  value	  of	  politically	  obligatory	  referendums	  with	  those	  that	  are	  called	  to	  purely	  serve	  the	  
partisan	   interests	   of	   a	   party	   leader	   or	   a	   President	   but	   are	   wholly	   unnecessary:	   L	   Morel,	   ‘The	   Rise	   of	   “Politically	  
Obligatory”	   Referendums:	   The	   2005	   French	   Referendum	   in	   Comparative	   Perspective’	   (2007)	   30(5)	   West	   European	  
Politics	  1041.	  	  	  	  
28	  See	  also	  Armstrong	  note	  20	  above,	  p	  270-­‐271.	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single state.29 This is accentuated by long-standing concerns with whether voters are even 
voting on the basis of the referendum issue (i.e. the treaty revision) or basing their vote choice 
on unrelated concerns, such as using the referendum to punish an unpopular government (a 
phenomenon known as second-order voting). 
 Given extant experience with direct popular veto points, and the well-documented 
growth in Eurosceptic sentiment since the Lisbon Treaty was drafted,30 it is unsurprising that 
elites have avoided larger scale treaty revisions. Tellingly the EU has deployed an array of 
tools to deal with the Eurozone crisis, such that the constitutional architecture of European 
economic governance has been profoundly changed,31 but with only the most minor of treaty 
revisions. 32  The treaty revision referendums may thus contain the seeds of their own 
destruction as their taxing and unpredictable nature leads to constitutional adaptation being 
pursued in ways that evade their application. This is another peril of the treaty revision 
referendum because it leads to the greater transparency and inclusiveness of the treaty 
revision rules being eschewed in favour of other routes to constitutional adaptation.   
	  
C.	  Policy	  referendums	  
 
Table 3: Policy referendums  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE  
Policy referendums are held by member states on a specific EU policy field, such as 
monetary policy, fiscal policy or foreign policy and have been the fastest growing category of 
EU referendums in recent years. In terms of peril for the EU, the most troubling is the 
enlargement referendum. The EU’s enlargement rules (currently Article 49 TEU) require 
accession treaties to be ratified by all the Member States ‘in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements’. There was no such constitutional requirement in France, but the 
President called a non-binding vote on the first wave of enlargement in 1972 and if the 
outcome had been unfavourable it is unlikely that France would have simply ratified the 
accession agreement. In short, a ‘No’ vote would have imperilled the EU’s first enlargement. 
More recently (2005) France introduced its first ever constitutionally obligatory referendum 
to require enlargement referendums following any accessions after Romania, Bulgaria and 
Croatia, although following a 2008 amendment this can be avoided via a particularly high 
super-majority in parliament.33 The French enlargement referendum lock threatens the future 
of the EU’s most successful foreign policy tool, especially if other Member States follow suit 
(an EU referendums domino logic was previously seen with the Constitutional Treaty).34 The 
new Dutch citizen-initiated referendum, considered further below, will surely see Eurosceptic 
groups seek its activation vis-à-vis future enlargements. In sum, future accessions will likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Memorably referred to as the ‘tyranny of the minority’: A Peters, ‘Referendums	   on	   the	   Constitutional	   Treaty	   2004:	   A	  
Citizens'	  Voice?’	  in	  D	  Curtin	  et	  al	  (eds)	  The	  EU	  Constitution:	  The	  Best	  Way	  Forward?	  (TMC	  Asser	  Press,	  2005).	  	  	  
30 See Figure 2 below.  
31 See F Fabbrini, Economic Governance in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2016).  
32	  A	  treaty	  revision	  adding	  two	  short	  sentences	  to	  Article	  136	  TFEU	  purporting	  to	  authorise	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  permanent	  
stability mechanism to safeguard the euro area. The European Stability Mechanism Treaty actually entered into force prior to the 
Article 136 revision and the Pringle ruling indicated	   that	   the	   revision	   had	   not	   been	   necessary: see	   Pringle,	   C-­‐370/12,	  
ECLI:EU:C:2012:756. 
33 Article 88-5 French Constitution (1958).  
34 Bottom-up direct democracy instruments have been used to try and generate a Turkish enlargement referendum in at least two 
Member States, in relation to Austria see IDEA note 7 above, p 87-88, in relation to Bulgaria, see Mendez et al note 21 above, p 
39-40.   
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need to navigate multiple enlargement referendums, and the peril for the EU, and the would-
be entrant, is thus obvious. If a negative vote occurred, recourse to the strategy employed with 
treaty revision – a second referendum – would seem difficult to justify. What could the 
European Council offer? The repackaging solution to the French and Dutch referendums on 
the Constitutional Treaty would also not appear feasible, for how does one repackage the 
accession of one or more countries in a manner more palatable to voters?35    
Whilst the perils of enlargement referendums are easy to identify, their promise much 
less so for there is something intuitively unattractive about holding enlargement hostage to 
the direct popular veto point of Member States. These referendums have been referred to by 
one direct democracy scholar as a ‘parody of democracy’ as ‘[t]he voters of one state have 
simply no legitimacy to decide on the accession of another state willing to join, especially if 
the people of that state have confirmed this will by way of a referendum.’ 36  To contest the 
legitimacy of such a referendum is not to defend the approach to recent enlargements which, 
as Shaw emphasised, saw no effective public debate taking place until candidate states had 
already received firm commitments.37  In terms of neutralizing the peril of enlargement 
referendums, Hillion drew on the duty of loyal cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) to suggest that 
as enlargement is one of the EU’s objectives, enforcement proceedings could be feasible 
where a state introduces constitutional requirements to make it virtually impossible to ratify 
an Accession Treaty.38  It is not clear whether a referendum requirement on Turkish accession 
counts as making it virtually impossible or whether even more rigorous requirements were 
intended such as a referendum and quorums, and parliamentary supermajorities. But either 
way, Article 49 TEU expressly stipulates ratification ‘by all the contracting states in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’ thus according virtually 
complete discretion as to those requirements. Article 4(2) TEU on the EU respecting Member 
States’ national identities inherent in their fundamental political and constitutional structures 
presents a further obstacle. Therefore contesting enlargement referendums appears legally 
untenable to say nothing of it being politically damaging for the EU if a Commission-led 
challenge were seriously contemplated.  
Referendums on adopting the Euro account for two policy referendums.  This is 
relatively few given that 19 states have adopted the Euro. With the exception of Denmark and 
the UK, Member States are legally obliged to join once they fulfil the entry conditions which 
helps explain why many states – including Austria, Finland, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia – 
that adopted the Euro relatively soon after EU accession referendums did not hold separate 
Euro referendums. It also helps explain Latvian and Lithuanian adoption of the Euro, without 
a popular vote, during the Eurozone crisis. However, this legal obligation, and an accession 
referendum less than a decade earlier, did not prevent Sweden from holding a consultative 
Euro referendum in 2003. The negative vote makes it politically impossible for Sweden to 
join without popular approval. That Swedish referendum was likely influenced by its Danish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Increased transitional measures for the acceding country is admittedly one possibility.  
36 Auer, note 5 above, p 406.    
37	  Shaw presciently observed, given the UK withdrawal referendum, that this was profoundly problematic and can give rise to 
resentment: J	  Shaw,	  ‘Europe's	  Constitutional	  Future’	  (2005)	  Public	  Law	  132.	  	  	  
38 C Hillion ‘The	   Creeping	   Nationalisation	   of	   the	   EU	   Enlargement	   Policy’	   (2010)	   Swedish	   Insitute	   for	   European	   Policy	  
Studies,	  Report	  No.	  6.  
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neighbour holding the first Euro referendum in 2000, with popular approval not 
forthcoming.39   
There is a clear promise dimension to Euro accession referendums as they supply 
popular legitimacy for the momentous decision of replacing a national currency and accepting 
Eurozone obligations. The main peril is that a popular veto prevents States from meeting their 
obligation to join. This is a very small price for the EU to pay to ensure that Eurozone 
accession has popular legitimacy. Unlike with a popular vote against a treaty revision or 
enlargement, a negative vote on Euro accession is not meaningfully extraterritorial: the Euro 
already exists and continues to exist regardless of referendums against joining.  
The policy referendums category also includes two rather idiosyncratic policy 
referendums. The first was an Italian consultative referendum in 1989 in which the people 
voted for the European Parliament to be accorded a mandate to draw up a constitution for 
Europe. This referendum was distinctive in that nothing directly flows from a yes vote 
because it is not up to the Italian electorate to accord such a mandate. The second is the Greek 
bailout referendum in mid-2015, following protracted negotiations between Greece and its 
Eurozone creditors. Its distinctive features included the shortest time between a referendum 
announcement and the vote (just over one week), and that the terms of the bailout package on 
which the Greek people voted had already been withdrawn by the creditors – not to mention 
that the referendum decision was ignored.40  
Finally, three recent additions to the EU’s referendum landscape have emerged. The 
first is referendums on ‘extra-EU treaties’. These treaties are intimately connected to EU law, 
and indeed can even make use of the EU’s institutions, but have hitherto only been concluded 
between a range of EU Member States and have also not required unanimous ratification. 
Accordingly the promise of these referendums is to supply popular endorsement for adhering 
to such treaties, while not generating the same level of peril for the EU as the treaty revision 
or enlargement referendum.41 The Fiscal Compact Treaty, primarily aimed at enhancing fiscal 
discipline by Eurozone states, was the first extra-EU treaty to be put to a referendum. The 
Irish people supported this treaty in a 2012 vote following the Attorney General’s 
recommendation that a referendum was required. In 2014 Denmark held the second extra-EU 
treaty referendum on the Unified Patent Court Agreement. The Danish Ministry of Justice 
concluded that the Agreement transferred sovereign powers and a referendum was 
successfully held once it became clear that a five-sixths parliamentary majority could not be 
obtained.42   
Unlike the extra-EU treaty referendums, the two latest additions to the EU’s 
referendum landscape create considerable peril for the EU. The first flowed from the Dutch 
Advisory Referendum Act of 2015 requiring a referendum to be held on laws or treaties 
approved by Parliament where at least 300,000 support it. It was immediately deployed vis-à-
vis the EU Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Only the Ukraine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Denmark’s referendum was constitutionally obligatory when a five-sixths parliamentary majority was not obtained, though it 
was already politically obligatory given the popularly approved Danish opt-outs from the single currency via their second 
Maastricht referendum. Denmark’s opt-outs account for another policy referendum, when in 2015 the voters rejected an 
arrangement allowing them to opt-in to Justice and Home Affairs measures (see further D Beach, ‘A tale of two referendums - 
the contrasts between low and high salience referendums in Denmark’ in Mendez and Mendez note 2 above).  
40	  For	   detailed	   discussion,	   see	   V	   Triga	   and	   V	   Manavopoulos,	   ‘The	   Greek	   bailout	   referendum	   of	   2015’,	   in	  Mendez and 
Mendez note 2 above.	  	  
41 In some cases there are mandatory ratifications for such treaties. Thus each of the four largest Eurozone states would have 
constituted veto points to the entry into force of the European Stability Mechanism Treaty, but both Italy and Germany would 
need a constitutional amendment to hold such a referendum, and although both France and Spain had previously held EU 
referendums no such referendums were considered. The Unified Patent Court Agreement has a mandatory requirement for 
French, German and UK ratification. The Fiscal Compact Treaty required ratification by 12 eurozone states.   
42 The Irish government’s legislative programme from June 2016 also foresaw a Unified Patent Court referendum. 
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Agreement met the initial threshold of 10,000 signatures within four weeks, and then easily 
satisfied the 300,000 signatures requirement. Popular approval was not forthcoming on the 
lowest turnout (32%) of any EU referendum held to date.43 Without Dutch approval the 
Agreement could not enter fully into force for the entirety of the EU.44 The Heads of State or 
Government of the EU’s Member States adopted a decision on the interpretation of the EU-
Ukraine Agreement at the European Council in December 2016 with a view to assisting the 
Dutch government in pursuing Parliamentary approval for ratification. Dutch ratification of 
this important EU Agreement is no small matter. The broader issue is that the new Dutch 
direct democracy instrument signals the birth of the citizen-initiated referendum on EU 
matters. As well as mixed agreements, the remit of this new instrument includes accession 
agreements and treaty revision and is becoming a focal point of activity for Eurosceptic 
groups. The peril from an EU perspective will be multiplied if the citizen-initiated referendum 
on EU matters spreads to other Member States.  
The latest addition to the EU policy referendum landscape emerged in Hungary 
following the EU’s response to the refugee crisis. Hungary was one of four Member States 
outvoted on the mandatory refugee relocation quota.45 Prime Minister Orbán responded by 
calling a referendum on whether the EU should have the power to impose compulsory 
settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the Hungarian Parliament’s 
approval.46  This 2016 referendum resulted in a predictably overwhelming majority against 
such resettlement, though failing to meet the turnout quorum.  There is a case for using 
infringement proceedings against such referendums for violating the Article 4(3) TEU duty of 
sincere cooperation. It is a discretionary referendum that can be viewed as doing the opposite 
of ‘ensuring fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties’ and refraining ‘from any 
measure which could jeapordise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.’ The political 
circumstances in Hungary were such that Commission intervention would never have halted 
the referendum.47 And it is certainly advisable for domestic constitutional challenges to run 
their course, and ideally prevent such a referendum from occurring, prior to Commission 
intervention.48  Nevertheless, there is a case for establishing that a Member State would 
breach Article 4(3) TEU where it holds, or seeks to hold, a referendum of this nature on an 
already adopted EU measure. This could deter Member States from embarking on the 
collision course that such referendums pose for the EU legal order. Recourse to EU level 
enforcement tools would also have damaging ramifications for the EU, but it may be a price 
worth paying to try to halt ex post referendums on binding EU decision-making from re-
emerging and spreading. 
	  
D.	  Assessing	  EU-­‐wide	  referendum	  proposals	  	  
 
There have long been calls for EU-wide referendums from eminent scholars in a wide array 
of fields.49 Our focus in this section is on EU-wide treaty revision referendums, but before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The 30% threshold in the Dutch Referendum Act encouraged abstention. 
44 For more details see J Van den Akker, ‘The Dutch EU	   referendums	   on	   the	   Constitutional	   Treaty	   (2005)	   and	   the	   EU-­‐
Ukraine	  Association	  Agreement	  (2016)’	  in	  Mendez	  and	  Mendez	  note	  2	  above.  
45 Council Decision (EU) No 2015/1601 [2015] OJ L119/80.  
46 For detailed discussion see Z T Pállinger, ‘The Hungarian Migrant Quota Referendum of 2016 in the Context of Hungarian 
Direct Democracy’ in Mendez and Mendez note 2 above. 
47 It was clear early on from a response to a parliamentary question that the Commission was monitoring the situation: E-
001991/2016, 12 May 2016. 
48	  On	  the	  challenges	  in	  Hungary,	  see	  Pállinger	  note	  46	  above.	  	  
49 Including social theorists (J Habermas, ‘A constitution for Europe?’ (2001)11 New Left Review 5), political philosophers (F 
Cheneval, ‘“Caminante, no hay camino, se hace camino al andar”: EU Citizenship, Direct Democracy and Treaty Ratification’ 
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doing so we comment briefly on proposals for an EU-wide referendum on a founding 
moment. De Gaulle had suggested the use of a Europe-wide referendum for a founding 
document as early as 1949, as did Spinelli for a new federal constitution in the early-1960s.50 
Such proposals proliferated following Maastricht most significantly via a proposal supported 
by some 97 members of the Convention.51 Although substantial legitimacy gains would flow 
from a popularly approved re-founding of the EU, where such proposals require popular 
approval in every Member State, as the convention proposal did, they impose the unrealistic 
ratification hurdle of unanimity. Many EU-wide referendum proposals for a new founding 
emerged when the EU had nearly half its current membership, and prior to popular rejections 
of the Constitutional Treaty. Those advocates might not be so favourably disposed to an EU-
wide referendum for a much enlarged EU, and thus additional veto points, in an increasingly 
eurosceptic climate.  
Cheneval has called for using EU-wide treaty revision referendums in the much 
enlarged EU.52 He advanced a powerful critique of the dysfunctional nature in which 
referendums have been haphazardly deployed in the treaty revision process, later accentuated 
by the Lisbon ratification saga where less than 1 per cent of the EU’s population in a single 
Member State was popularly consulted.  Cheneval articulates prima facie compelling 
legitimacy and democracy enhancing qualities for an EU-wide treaty revision referendum. 
However, this proposal faces the same criticism applicable to an EU-wide referendum for a 
founding moment wedded to unanimous ratification, namely it is an unrealistic ratification 
hurdle. The EU has arguably the most rigid rules of amendment in existence.53 To think in 
federal terms, no federation, even those with as few states as Australia – six – accord all 
constituent units a veto point over the general constitutional revision procedure. To convert 
the existing veto point into a popular veto point only exacerbates the rigidity of the EU’s rules 
of change. Even the last major treaty revision, Lisbon, was unable in the first instance to 
surmount the only Member State referendum held (Ireland).  
Cheneval’s proposal emerged prior to the onset of the financial crisis and the 
Eurozone crisis, which has led to a considerable deterioration in the image of the EU as 
shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Image of the EU trend line 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
Figure 2 shows a marked downward trend in positive views of the EU and a commensurate 
rise in negative views of the EU since the crisis. However, this data is at EU-level and masks 
important differences among EU member states. Hobolt and de Vries have rightly taken 
account of variation in national settings to provide a more nuanced and upbeat assessment of 
support for the EU.54 Even if there is not such a clear downward trend in support for the EU, 
these are inauspicious times to be proposing EU-wide referendums wedded to unanimous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2007) 13 (5) European Law Journal 6470), political scientists (R Rose, Representing Europeans (Oxford University Press, 
2013)), legal scholars (Auer notes 5 and 13 above), and public choice economists (B Frey, ‘A directly democratic and federal 
Europe’ (1996) 7(4) Constitutional Political Economy 267). 
50	  S	  Hobolt, Europe	  in	  Question:	  Referendums	  on	  European	  Integration	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  245.	  
51	  See	  further	  on	  such	  proposals	  Mendez	  and	  Mendez	  note	  2	  above,	  p	  68	  et	  seq.	  	  	  
52 Cheneval note 49 above. 
53 Existing comparative analysis of constitutional amendment difficulty has not included the EU. See for a brief overview of the 
literature, R Albert ‘The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada’ (2015) 39 Alberta Law Review 85.  
54	  S	  Hobolt	  and	  C	  de	  Vries	  ‘Public	  support	  for	  European	  integration’	  (2016)	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Political	  Science	  413.	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ratification as the standard treaty revision model.  Making future treaty change theoretically 
democratic, becomes, paradoxically, an undemocratic proposal if treaty change is made 
practically unattainable. It would seal away the treaty text from meaningful democratic 
contestation and heighten the existing pressure on other less democratic means of 
constitutional adaptation. In short, the promise of such proposals seems unattainable while the 
peril seems all too real. 
Most EU-wide treaty revision referendum proposals have however argued for high 
double majorities (of both voters and member states).55 They aspire to unleash the purported 
promise for the EU of popular voting, while avoiding the peril of increased rigidity via a 
single state popular veto point.  Some have drawn on popular support for EU treaty revisions 
to take place via referendums to bolster the case for EU-wide treaty revisions.56 Proposing to 
surmount the unanimous ratification requirement is often challenged as a federalist step too 
far, even though other large international organisations do not remain wedded to unanimity.57 
But adding a harmonised ratification requirement is considerably more intrusive in a way that 
federal regimes, unlike international organisations, often are. It also requires a device to be 
deployed that is either currently impermissible at the national level (eg, Germany and 
Belgium), or impermissible in relation to treaties (eg, Italy).58   
EU-wide referendum proposals also often ignore the nature of the EU’s treaty text. Its 
overinclusiveness in particular,59 should lead one to caution against EU-wide referendums as 
the standard amendment procedure.  For example the recent revision to transitionally 
accommodate a greater number of MEPs, because the Lisbon Treaty provisions providing for 
this only entered into force after the 2009 elections, would hardly be of sufficient 
constitutional import to warrant an EU-wide referendum. Determining which revisions 
warrant an EU-wide referendum could be modelled on the new treaty revision rules (Article 
48(2) TEU).  Under these the EU convention route need not occur if the European Council 
determines, with European Parliament consent, as it did for the MEP revision noted above, 
that it is not justified by the extent of the proposed amendments.  
An additional problem with EU-wide treaty revision referendum proposals is the 
absence of consideration to campaign regulation. Even within EU States that use referendums 
there is considerable regulatory divergence on questions that include the extent of public and 
private financing, constraints on broadcast and print media, regulation of information 
campaigns and civil society groups, as well as the role of independent electoral bodies.60 EU-
wide referendum proposals have not engaged with the sheer heterogeneity of referendum 
campaign practices across the EU. Nor has a regulatory model been suggested. One could 
propose the least intrusive model whereby, with perhaps the exception of the day to hold the 
referendum, matters are left to the domestic constitutional system, through to the most 
intrusive model whereby some of the aforementioned issues are regulated at EU level.  
We conclude by highlighting the most obvious problem with these EU-wide 
referendum proposals. It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which the political will to 
overcome the unanimous ratification lock could be found, much less doing so while not only 
stipulating, but potentially even regulating, the ratification procedure. Thus promise there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 For a recent example, see Rose note 49 above.   
56	  See Rose, ibid, Mendez et al, note 21 above, relying on 2009 European Election Studies data showing a clear majority of EU 
citizens (62.9%) either ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ that EU treaty changes should be decided by referendum. 
57 See discussion in Mendez et al, ibid, chapter 6. 
58 Article 75 of the Italian Constitution (1947).  
59	  Overinclusive	   as	   the	   treaty	   text	   contains	  much	   that	   is	   not	  worthy	   of	   constitutional	   rank,	   but	   each	  major	   new	   treaty	  
revision	  brought	  in	  more	  detail	  relating	  to	  policy	  areas	  and	  institutional	  procedures.	  	  
60	  See eg, T Reidy and J Suiter ‘Do Rules Matter? Categorizing the Regulation of Referendum Campaigns’ (2015) 38 Electoral 
Studies 159.  
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may well be, but political feasibility there is not. And there is a peril that contributes to this 
political infeasibility, namely what happens to one or more Member States unable to deliver 
popular approval for a treaty revision? The federal answer, subject to any opting out 
possibility, is that the amendments would still apply to all; the non-federal answer would 
permit withdrawal, and both create obvious peril for the EU.  
  
III.	  THE	  EUROPEAN	  CITIZENS’	  INITIATIVE:	  MORE	  
PROMISE	  THAN	  PERIL	  
	  
This part turns to the EU’s new instrument of direct democracy. The first two sections focus 
on the ECI’s design choices as outlined in the treaty text and the implementing regulation. A 
third section assesses the outcomes over the first five years and a final section explores the 
potential future of the ECI.  
	  
A.	  Origins	  and	  treaty-­‐enshrined	  design	  choices	  
	  
The origins of the ECI are usually attributed to a proposal by a German Bundestag 
delegate included in the draft Constitutional Treaty at the culmination of the convention 
process.61 This proposal underscored that its effect was ‘to bring Europe closer to the people, 
as Laeken recommended’ and represented ‘a large step in the democratisation of the Union.’62 
The Commission’s right of legislative initiative was left intact as the request to submit 
proposals would be to the Commission. In effect it would equalise the position of EU citizens 
with the Council and the European Parliament’s treaty-derived power to request Commission 
action.63 This made it a more palatable option than more adventurous direct democratic 
innovations put forth during the convention process.  
Crucially, the language proposed by the Convention expressly borrowed from the 
language of the Parliament’s right to request a proposal from the Commission by stipulating a 
requirement for the ‘citizens’ to consider that such an ‘act is required for the purpose of 
implementing this Constitution’ (‘treaty’ under then Art. 192(2) EC). The Parliament’s right 
was never thought to extend to requesting proposals for treaty revision,64 that not being 
consistent with the language of being ‘required for the purpose of implementing this treaty’, 
and express reliance on the provision only ever involved requesting legislative proposals.65 
Direct borrowing of this language for the ECI, retained in the Lisbon Treaty, renders it 
unreasonable to conclude that citizens were empowered to request treaty revision proposals.  
This restriction is of considerable consequence because the policy density of the EU’s treaty 
text is such that much that might not be off limits in a national agenda initiative, because it 
falls within legislative competence, would be off limits in the EU.   For citizens this curtails 
the ECI’s potential promise and could generate discontent with the EU, thus constituting part 
of the peril of the ECI.  
The Convention ECI proposal left much to be determined by an implementing law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  See	   V	   Cuesta-­‐López,	   ‘A	   Comparative	   Approach	   to	   the	   Regulation	   on	   the	   European	   Citizens'	   Initiative’	   (2012)	   13(3)	  	  
Perspectives	  on	  European	  Politics	  and	  Society	  257,	  258.	  	  	  	  
62	  CONV	  724/03.	  	  
63	  The	  Council	   always	   had	   this	   power	   (currently	  Art	   241	  TFEU),	   the	  Parliament	  was	   given	   it	   by	   the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  
(currently	  Art	  225	  TFEU).  	  
64	  The	  Parliament	  was	  expressly	  accorded	  the	  power	  to	  propose	  treaty	  revisions	  via	  the	  Constitutional	  Treaty,	  which	  was	  
retained	  in	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  (Article	  48	  TEU)	  
65	  On	  use	  of	  this	  power	  to	  date,	  see	  R	  Corbett	  et	  al,	  The	  European	  Parliament,	  9th	  ed	  (John	  Harper,	  2016).	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However, the end product in the draft Constitutional Treaty, retained in the Constitutional 
Treaty and the Lisbon repackaging, added into the primary text the minimum required 
threshold of signatures, namely no ‘less than one million’, and the additional constraint that 
signatures must come from ‘a significant number of Member States’.66 A territorial based 
constraint, the specifics of which were to be determined by the implementing regulation, is 
understandable given that we are dealing with a political system composed of sovereign states 
and the very premise behind the instrument is to generate a transnational dimension. The 
signature threshold is comparatively low in that the Constitutional Treaty was expected to 
come into force for an EU of around 480 million, thus barely over 0.2% of the EU’s 
population and less than 0.2% by the time the Lisbon Treaty entered into force for an EU of 
then over 500 million.67 To use examples of agenda initiatives within the EU’s member states, 
many have thresholds of over 1%, less than 0.5% is rare indeed, and only Italy has a 
requirement lower than the ECI at under 0.1%.68 The ECI’s low threshold therefore points to a 
willingness to see its democratic promise unleashed. Comparative borrowing could have been 
used to justify a threshold two or more times the 1 million figure, that paradoxically could 
have resulted in a direct democratic instrument that, because of high triggering thresholds, 
exacerbates popular discontent with the democratic workings of the EU.  
 
B.	  Design	  choices	  in	  the	  implementing	  regulation	  
 
The potential promise of the ECI depended crucially on design choices made via the 
implementing regulation. While the Lisbon ratification saga was ongoing, the European 
Parliament called for the Commission to bring forth a legislative proposal without delay after 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.69 The Commission Green Paper actually appeared 
before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. 70  Within months the legislative proposal 
emerged, political agreement was reached by the end of the year, and the Regulation was 
adopted in February 2011, and became applicable on 1 April 2012.71 This unusually fast 
journey through the legislative process attested to a desire to tap the potential of the Lisbon 
Treaty’s most important democratic innovation. In what follows we focus on some central 
design choices taken by the implementing Regulation; some enhance the democratic promise 
of this instrument, while others make it less accessible and may accordingly generate citizen 
discontent that could bolster the ECI’s peril for the EU.   
The Treaty provides that the one million signatures must come from ‘a significant 
number of Member States’. The Regulation stipulated that at least one-quarter of the Member 
States would be required (Article 7(1)), in line with the Parliament’s initial call for a proposal 
and in contrast to the Commission’s proposal for one-third. For ordinary language usage, and 
with a view to facilitating the threshold being surmounted, one could argue for an even lower 
number, in that, for example, one-fifth is arguably a significant number of Member States. 
For the Commission the one-quarter threshold was thought too low to guarantee that the 
Union interest was adequately reflected. Fortunately the Parliament’s proposal prevailed 
which better serves the ECI’s democratic promise.  
A second crucial choice was a signature threshold from each of the minimum number 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Respectively	  Article	  I-­‐46(4)	  Draft	  Constitutional	  Treaty;	  Article	  I-­‐47(4)	  Constitutional	  Treaty;	  Article	  11(4)	  TEU.	  	  
67	  UK	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  EU	  would	  move	  this	  to	  over	  0.2%.	  	  
68	  See	  for	  details	  Cuesta-López	  note	  61	  above.	  	  	  
69	  P6_TA(2009)0389	  (7	  May	  2009).	  	  
70	  COM(2009) 622.	  
71 Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 [2011] OJ L65/1.  
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of Member States required. No such constraint was outlined in the Treaty. However, given 
the requirement of a minimum number of member states and the related logic of creating a 
meaningful level of European-wide support, it would be anomalous for wholly nominal 
support in one or more of the requisite minimum number of states to suffice. The Parliament’s 
resolution proposed a 0.2% threshold, but the choice ultimately adopted (Article 7(2)) 
corresponds to the number of MEP’s elected in each member state multiplied by 750. The 
consequence of this degressive proportionality is that a number of the smaller member states 
would have to obtain over 0.2% (considerably more in Luxembourg and Malta) to count as 
one of the seven member states required, but with the major advantage that the vast majority 
of states would need 0.2% or less, and the four biggest would not even need to obtain 0.1%.  
Unsurprisingly for a twenty-first century agenda initiative, the possibility to collect 
statements electronically was expressly provided for (Articles 5(2) and 6) which considerably 
facilitates attaining the requisite statements in support. The minimum age adopted for 
supporting initiatives was the age at which citizens are entitled to vote in European 
Parliament elections (Article 3(4)), which is 18 in all Member States bar Austria where it is 
16. The consultation exercise saw some support for a threshold of 16 on the basis that this 
would encourage youth civic participation on European issues and that this is not an election 
but merely an agenda-initiative. Tying the age requirement for initiatives to that of elections 
is the comparative norm,72 but there remains much to be said for a lower age requirement for 
the previously mentioned reasons and to facilitate reaching the signature thresholds. 73 
However, ultimately it does not appear to have been seriously contemplated, which is 
unsurprising insofar as it would require Member States (Austria aside) to produce new 
electoral lists. 
The Commission Green Paper considered that requiring a citizens’ committee to 
organize an initiative might be too burdensome and preferred not to impose any restrictions 
on who could present an initiative. The legislative proposal accordingly permitted both EU 
citizens and legal persons and other organizations to organize initiatives. At the behest of the 
European Parliament a requirement for a citizens’ committee composed of at least seven EU 
citizens resident in at least seven different Member States was introduced (Article 3(2)). 
Although additional hurdles make it harder to get an initiative up and running, the redeeming 
virtue here was to insert a transnational dimension that helps foster political debate across 
borders and hopefully creates a network for pursuing statements across at least seven Member 
States.  
The citizens’ committee would be responsible for preparing the proposed initiative 
and submitting it to the Commission. In terms of the form and content, the Green Paper 
rightly saw the draft legal act requirement in some legal systems as unnecessarily restrictive 
and burdensome as well as not being required by the treaty text.74 The Regulation merely 
requires the title, the subject matter, the description of objectives (in respectively no more 
than 100, 200, and 500 characters) and the treaty provisions considered relevant.75 These are 
prima facie not especially taxing requirements, though identifying relevant treaty provisions 
in the complex legal system of the EU is no small feat. But this alone will not get an ECI 
registered so that the signature collecting process can begin. An ex ante registration test, 
applicable prior to commencing the signature gathering exercise, was introduced. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  See	  Cuesta-López	  note	  61	  above.	  	  
73	  See also M Dougan, ‘What are we to make of the citizens' initiative?’ (2011) 48 (6) Common Market Law Review 1807.   
74	  	  In some national systems where such a requirement exists it is constitutionally enshrined as in Austria and Italy: see	  Cuesta-
López	  note	  61	  above,	  p	  263.	  	  
75	  Article	  4(1)	  and	  Annex	  II.	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European Parliament resolution proposed such a test, but the Green Paper was against this. 
The consultation process saw many support an admissibility test prior to all signatures being 
collected. The legislative proposal thus provided for an admissibility test following the 
collection of 300,000 signatures (Article 8), but during the legislative process this gave way 
to an ex ante registration test.  The main logic is to avoid frustrating citizens who have 
supported an initiative that is later found inadmissible. On the other hand, an ex ante test 
could have democratically pernicious consequences for the EU by foreclosing the emergence 
of transnational debate. The extent to which debate will be foreclosed ultimately depends on 
the substance of the admissibility test and how it is applied.  
The Regulation lays out four conditions before the Commission can register an 
initiative (Article 4(2)). The first concerns the organizing committee being appropriately 
formed (Article 4(2)(a)). The second to fourth require respectively that it must ‘not manifestly 
fall outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of 
the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’ (Article 4(2)(b)), nor be ‘manifestly 
abusive, frivolous or vexatious’ (Article 4(2)(c)), nor ‘manifestly contrary to the values of the 
Union as set out in Article 2 TEU’ (Article 4(2)(d)).  The second of these conditions textually 
replicates the Treaty text itself, albeit now adding the rider of ‘manifestly’ which suggests an 
exacting standard for refusing registration on this ground.  The third and fourth conditions 
appear to leave more discretion to the Commission.76 Oversight is expressly stipulated in the 
Regulation, the Commission being required to inform organisers of its reasons for refusal and 
of judicial and extra-judicial remedies (Article 4(3)).  
The Regulation adopted the 12 month period for signature collection of the 
Commission proposal (Article 5(5)), which reflected the earlier Parliament resolution. In 
comparative terms this seems defensible in that the collection period for agenda initiatives in 
EU member states was generally six months or less.77 The Commission emphasised the need 
to ensure that citizens’ initiatives remain relevant and that the collection period be sufficiently 
long in light of the complexity of working throughout the EU. However precisely the latter 
rationale justified a longer period and the 18 months which some consultation contributions 
suggested would have been preferable.78  Whilst 12 months is more than any directly 
comparable instrument,79 the ECI is a novel transnational instrument for a complex political 
system to which citizens show great apathy. If an 18 month period for the related instrument 
of a citizen-initiated referendum was thought appropriate for the most experienced user of 
direct democracy, Switzerland, then arguably the EU should not be opting for less with its 
fledging instrument of direct democracy.80  
Further crucial design issues concerned data. No uniformity was imposed as to data to 
be collected from signatories. The main distinction is between those States requiring personal 
ID numbers (whether from a passport or national identity card), a requirement that the 
European Data Protection Supervisor recommended dropping,81 and those that do not.82 In 
principle the more data required, the more reluctant citizens will be to sign. When it comes to 
this personal data the organisers are, along with competent national authorities, the ‘data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  See	  further	  Dougan	  note	  73	  above,	  p	  1840-­‐41.	  
77	  Spain	  has	  nine	  months,	  extendable	  by	  three	  months:	  see V Cuesta-López, ‘The Spanish Agenda Initiative and the Reform 
of its Legal Regime: A New Chance for Participatory Democracy’ in M Setälä and T Schiller (eds) Citizens’ Initiatives in 
Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 	  
78	  The	  European	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Committee	  (EESC)	  also	  called	  for	  18	  months:	  see	  [2011]	  OJ	  C44/34.	  	  	  	  
79	  Some	  agenda	  initiatives	  do	  not	  have	  time	  limits:	  eg,	  Portugal. 	  
80	  See	  on	  Swiss	  direct	  democracy,	  U	  Serdült ‘Referendums in Switzerland’, in M Qvortrup (ed) Referendums around the World 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 	  
81	  See	  Opinion	  of	  the	  EDPS	  [2010]	  OJ	  C323/1.	  	  
82	  See	  Article	  5(3)	  and	  Annex	  III.	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controllers’ for Data Protection Directive purposes (Article 12) and have obligations imposed 
upon them. Indeed, the Regulation specifically underscores their personal liability for any 
damage they cause in organizing a citizens’ initiative,83 which will discourage the formation 
of citizens’ committees and therefore reduce the potential promise of the ECI. 
No meaningful consideration was given to public funding towards the costs of 
preparing an initiative and sustaining the signature gathering campaign. The Parliament’s 
resolution was silent and the Green Paper asserted that no specific public funding was 
foreseen and that this was ‘in the interest of preserving the independence and citizen-driven 
nature of initiatives.’ The ECI Regulation thus offers no public funding for organisers. 
Indeed, it provides for the Commission to maintain an official online register with proposed 
citizens’ initiatives, and stipulates that organisers can provide the initiative in other official 
EU languages for this register and that such translation shall be their responsibility.84 It is 
especially striking that no translating support was provided given the translating resources at 
the EU’s disposal and how obviously critical this would be to gathering signatures in a 
transnational union with twenty-four official languages. Public funding for agenda initiatives 
is relatively rare, but even within the EU Spain provides this.85 This offered a valuable 
comparative lesson for the EU to secure a more hospitable environment for launching its new 
instrument of direct democracy.  
A final crucial design choice concerned the obligations that flow from an initiative 
meeting the relevant thresholds.  The legislative proposal required the Commission to 
examine the initiative within a set time frame and set out its conclusions in a communication 
including what, if any, actions it would take and the reasons. This in itself is more than is 
formally required by, for example, the Italian agenda initiative.86 Two crucial obligations 
were added during the legislative process. Firstly, that the Commission receive the organisers 
at an appropriate level so that they can explain the matters raised by the initiative and, 
secondly, that the organisers be given the opportunity to present their initiative at a public 
hearing at the European Parliament with the Commission present and other EU institutions 
and bodies that wish to participate (Articles 10 & 11). These valuable additions enhance the 
democratic promise for the ECI and generate a greater incentive to pursue initiatives as there 
is a tangible outcome flowing from meeting the required thresholds.  
 
C.	  Assessing	  outcomes	   
	  
Table 4 illustrates ECI activity levels over the first five years. This section is divided into two 




Table	  4:	  ECI	  Outcomes	  (April	  2012-­‐April	  2017) 
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83	  Article	  13.	  Article	  14	  is	  on	  penalties.	  	  
84	  Article	  4(1).	  	  
85	  See	  for	  Spain,	  Cuesta-López, note 77 above,	  208.	  	  	  
86	  See	  P	  V	  Uleri,	  ‘Institutions	  of	  Citizens’	  Political	  Participation	  in	  Italy:	  Crooked	  Forms,	  Hindered	  Institutionalization’	  in	  M 
Setälä and T Schiller (eds) Citizens’ Initiatives in Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 75. 	  
87	  All	   initiatives,	   and	   registration	   refusals,	   mentioned	   in	   this	   section	   can	   be	   found	   on	   the	   online	   official	   register	   at:	  	  
http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-­‐initiative/public/welcome	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1.	  Registration	  refusals	  	  
 
Table 4 reflects the 20 listed registration refusals in the official online register through to 
April 2017.  This constitutes just under one-third of the initiatives to date (comparatively less 
registration refusals than was recently the case via the Spanish national and regional agenda 
initiatives).88 The high water mark of registration refusals existed throughout 2014 when there 
was roughly a 60/40 split between the registered initiatives and registration refusals through 
to that date. This led to frequent criticism of the Commission for allegedly taking an overly 
restrictive approach that stifled initiatives and the transnational debate the ECI was intended 
to create.  Indeed the 40% figure was often quoted, and continues to be despite growth in 
registered initiatives, as if this alone demonstrated that the registration test was being 
inappropriately applied.89 Actual analysis of the registration refusals has been rare,90 though it 
is common knowledge that they were all on Article 4(2)(b) grounds, namely falling 
manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s power to submit a proposal for a legal 
act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.  
Far less common knowledge is what the rejected initiatives actually proposed and it is 
submitted that the vast majority were obviously non-starters.  In several cases this was even 
apparent from their titles and the clear absence of legal bases that would allow such action. 
This includes proposing: abolishing the European Parliament; Stopping Brexit; creating a 
European Public Bank focused on social, ecological and solidarity development; singing the 
European anthem in Esperanto; EU referendums (twice). These are obvious non-starters if 
one accepts that initiatives cannot be used to propose treaty revision. The FAQ section of the 
Commission maintained official register states that citizens cannot request treaty revision. 
The first registration refusal to expressly state this was the response in January 2013 to a 
proposed initiative entitled ‘Enforcing selfdetermination Human Right in the EU’ that aimed 
‘to accommodate within the EU’s legal framework the selfdetermination human rights’ and 
which itself invoked Article 48(2) TEU. Registration refusals accordingly confirm the 
exclusion of treaty revision proposals, though this could still be subject to judicial challenge.  
Another unsurprising refusal concerned ‘My Voice Against Nuclear Power’. This 
sought phase-out plans for nuclear power plants which the Commission underscored fell 
within Euratom Treaty competence on which a citizens’ initiative could not be based and that 
it was in any event ‘manifestly contrary to the objectives of the Euratom Treaty, as stated in 
its preamble and its Article 1, namely the establishment and growth of the nuclear industries’. 
A proposed initiative seeking to guarantee the retention of EU citizenship to citizens from a 
new state that resulted from secession of a part of an EU Member State was rightly rejected 
on the basis that there was no legal basis for secondary legislation to deal with such an issue 
and that Article 20 TFEU provides that only those holding the nationality of a Member State 
are EU citizens.  Another predictable rejection concerned a proposed initiative to ban the 
legalization of prostitution with the Commission underscoring that prostitution in and of itself 
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  See	  Cuesta-López, note  77 above, 208. 	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  For a recent example see the EESC opinion on the ECI [2016] OJ C389/35, para 3.10.2.	  Note	  also	  C	  Berg	  and	  P	  Glogowski,	  
‘Heavy	  Stones	  in	  the	  Road:	  The	  ECI	  in	  Practice’,	  	  in M Conrad et al (eds) Bridging the Gap? Opportunities & Constraints of the 
European Citizens’ Initiative (Nomos 2016) 199, p 213, stating, while relying on data through to 2014, that ‘[n]early half of the 
proposed ECIs have been declared “legally inadmissible”’. 	  
90	  But	   see	   J Organ, ‘Decommissioning direct democracy? A critical analysis of Commission decision-making on the legal 
admissibility of European Citizens Initiative proposals’ (2014) 10(3) European Constitutional Law Review 422. A study critical 
of registration refusals asserted that ‘[a]round one quarter of the initiatives refused registration’ fall into the category of 
‘Initiatives that were (possibly or probably) within the EU’s competence’ but in fact only mentions two examples and only one 
comes with anything by way of explanation: see The European Citizens’ Initiative Registration: Falling at the First Hurdle?  
(ECAS 2015), p 14-15.   
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was a Member State competence and that Article 84 TFEU excluded any harmonization of 
Member State laws and regulations. 
Four more unsurprising rejections all concerned animal welfare.  In one case the title 
alone, ‘Abolition of bullfighting and the use of bulls in festivals involving cruelty and torture 
for entertainment in Europe’, is arguably testament to the forthcoming registration refusal. 
Any such legislative action would be in direct tension with Article 13 TFEU which in the 
animal welfare context requires the Union to respect ‘the legislative or administrative 
provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to…cultural traditions and 
regional heritage.’ The Commission therefore emphasised that it was ‘required to recognize 
bullfighting and the use of bulls in festivals as a cultural tradition and part of the regional 
heritage of some Member States’.  The other three animal welfare initiatives have similar 
reasoning employed in the registration refusals. They underscore the Jippes ruling91 and that 
ensuring animal welfare is not an objective of the Treaties, that existing Union legislation on 
animal welfare has been adopted on Common Agricultural Policy, Internal Market and 
Environmental legal bases but that the proposed initiatives would not contribute to any of the 
objectives of those policies as set out in the Treaties.92  
Another three refusals were less immediately obvious non-starters, however the 
decisions were all upheld before the General Court.93 So far we have briefly accounted for 17 
of the 20 registration refusals. On this basis alone one could contest the notion that there has 
been something fundamentally amiss with the application of the registration test.  
Furthermore, two of the remaining three resulted in amended initiatives that were duly 
registered.94  However, the remaining rejection stood out as one of two clearly contestable 
refusals. The first – ‘Minority SafePack’ – is not actually included under refused registrations 
in Table 4 because it was registered following a legal challenge and removed from the 
register of refused requests (an outcome which may yet apply to the second contestable 
refusal – ‘STOP TTIP’ – considered further below). The ‘Minority SafePack’ initiative 
proposed legal acts ‘to improve the protection of persons belonging to national and linguistic 
minorities and strengthen cultural and linguistic diversity in the Union.’95 Although the 
Commission considered that some of the acts requested might individually fall within its 
powers to submit a proposal it concluded that the ECI Regulation ‘does not provide for the 
registration of part or parts of a proposed initiative’ and that accordingly it fell foul of Article 
4(2)(b). It is true that the Regulation does not provide for this, but nor patently does it 
stipulate the contrary, and the more citizen-friendly reading would be to register those parts 
which are considered to fall within the Commission’s powers. This was part of the basis for a 
legal challenge which the General Court did not deal with because it found in favour of the 
organisers on a different plea concerning the Commission failing to state reasons by not 
indicating which of the 11 proposed measures did not fall within its competence, nor the 
reasons supporting that conclusion.96 The initiative was particularly detailed as considerable 
additional information was included in an annex as the ECI Regulation permits. And the 
registration refusal was strikingly curt as only five short paragraphs dealt with the specificity 
of the Minority SafePack initiative, the rest being the standard text used in nearly every other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Jippes,	  C-­‐189/01,	  ECLI:EU:C:2001:420. 
92 The	   most	   recent	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   concerned	   the	   protection	   of	   stray	   animals	   and	   was	   unsuccessfully	   challenged	   before	   the	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  Court:	  HB	  v	  Commission,	  T-­‐361/14,	  ECLI:EU:T:2017:252.	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  See	   respectively,	   Anagnostakis	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   Commission,	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   appeal	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  ‘Unconditional	  Basic	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  Sociale’.	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  C(2013)	  5969	  final	  13.9.2013.	  	  
96	  Minority SafePack v Commission, T-646/13, ECLI:EU:T:2017:59  
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registration refusal. For the General Court, without a complete statement of reasons the 
possibility of introducing a new proposed ECI that took into account the Commission’s 
objections would be seriously compromised as would be the objectives referred to in the ECI 
Regulation of encouraging participation by citizens in the democratic life of the Union.   
The Minority SafePack ruling should discourage perfunctory registration refusals and 
in turn make it easier for organizers to successfully resubmit refused proposals. The ruling 
certainly did not require the Commission to register any part of the initiative. Nonetheless the 
Commission responded by registering it with the exception of two proposed acts that were not 
considered to fall within its powers.97 That the Commission was able to conclude that fully 
nine of the 11 proposed acts were within its powers makes it even more striking that it refused 
to register those parts in the first place. In any event, an extremely important consequence of 
the Minority SafePack ruling, though not required by it,98 is the Commission reconsidering its 
initial reading of the ECI Regulation as precluding the registration of parts of an initiative. 
This should obviously lead to increased registrations.  
This brings us to our outstanding registration refusal. ‘STOP TTIP’ proposed 
repealing the negotiating mandate for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) and not concluding the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The 
Commission’s response in relation to TTIP was that Council decisions authorizing the 
opening of negotiations are preparatory acts and deploy legal effects only between the 
institutions concerned and, in relation to both TTIP and CETA, that inviting the Commission 
not to propose a legal act is not admissible under the ECI and likewise in relation to 
proposing a decision not to adopt a legal act, since such a decision would not deploy 
autonomous legal effects. In effect the Commission proposed a distinction between types of 
‘legal acts’ that cannot be found in either the implementing Regulation or the treaty-enshrined 
ECI text, nor for that matter any other EU treaty text. This registration refusal therefore 
appeared particularly suspect and it was unsurprising that the legal challenge brought by the 
organisers succeeded before the General Court.99 Indeed for the Court ‘the principle of 
democracy’ required an interpretation of the concept of legal acts that covered such acts. A 
number of arguments from the Commission were rejected including the striking proposition 
that the proposed acts ‘would lead to an inadmissible interference in an ongoing legislative 
procedure’, the Court underscoring that to the contrary it constituted ‘an expression of the 
effective participation of citizens of the European Union in the democratic life thereof’.   
It remains to be seen whether the STOP TTIP ruling is appealed or whether the 
Commission simply proceeds to register the initiative.  The registration refusal did recognise 
that initiatives could be used to request the signature and conclusion of international 
agreements. This is relatively unsurprising given that the EU’s agenda initiative, unlike in 
some constitutional systems, contains no international agreements subject matter exclusion.100  
Precisely the absence of this subject matter exclusion made defending this registration refusal 
a difficult task. The ramifications of the General Court’s ruling are considerable and likely to 
be viewed by the Commission, and the Council, as posing a considerable peril to the EU’s 
future trade relations in particular. But what from one perspective can be viewed as peril for 
the EU, can from the angle of the citizens be viewed as promise as it contributes to increased 
policy responsiveness in the field of the EU’s international relations.  
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  COM(2017)2200	  final	  29.3.2017.	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  The	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  future	  ruling	  that	  would	  require	  it.	  	  
99	  Efler	  v	  Commission,	  T-­‐754/14,	  ECLI:EU:T:2017:323.	  
100	  See	  e.g.	  Article	  87.3	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Constitution.	  	  	  
	   22	  
That the ‘STOP TTIP’ registration refusal appeared markedly suspect, as did the 
initial unwillingness to partially register the ‘Minority SafePack’ initiative, should not lead us 
to accept the harshest criticism of the Commission. Those two refusals raise key issues but 
only account for one of the currently listed registration refusals or two out of the 21 that have 
ever taken place. Even if both had initially been registered it would still have been possible to 
accurately assert in 2014 that nearly 40% of proposed initiatives had been rejected. Put 
simply, the criticism has been exaggerated as the vast majority of proposed initiatives have 
been obvious non-starters. This has nonetheless become one of the perils of the ECI because a 
damaging narrative has emerged of Brussels bureaucrats inappropriately standing in the way 
of meaningful citizen involvement.  
 
2.	  Registered	  initiatives	  	  	  
 
The tally of registered initiatives through to April 2017 is at 43.101 The range of policy 
areas has included amongst others social policy, environmental policy, animal welfare, and 
education.  So far three have met the signature thresholds. The insufficient support category is 
at 18. Two are closed for which no signature data is available on the official register as well 
as six for which the collection is on-going. Of particular interest in the on-going collection 
category is the ‘Stop Glyphosate’ initiative concerned with banning a pesticide and reforming 
pesticide approval procedure. It was registered in January 2017 and, according to the 
organisers, had obtained over 1 million signatures by May 2017 and was due to be submitted 
to the Commission in July 2017.  It has received more funding (€240,000) than any that met 
the signature thresholds. But sizable funding has been no guarantee of meeting these 
thresholds. The prime example is ‘Fair Transport Europe’ which concerned fair competition 
and equal treatment of workers in transport sectors and which received €322,000 from the 
European Transport Workers Federation. That such a (comparatively) well-funded initiative 
backed by trade unions throughout Europe has been unable to collect the necessary support is 
testament to the enormity of the challenge.  If getting a citizens initiative registered is likely 
to be beyond the realistic capacities of the ‘ordinary’ EU citizen, then meeting the signature 
thresholds is particularly unlikely in the absence of considerable backing from civil society 
organisations.  
 The three initiatives that met the signature thresholds were all backed by civil society 
organisations.  All three were registered between May and June 2012. The first, the 
‘Right2Water’ initiative, was essentially about preventing the privatization of water services 
and received 1.6 million signatures. It was launched and backed by the European Federation 
of Public Services Union from which it received €140,000. The second, the ‘One of Us’ 
initiative, proposed an EU-wide ban & termination of financing of activities which 
presuppose the destruction of human embryos and received 1.7 million signatures. It was 
initiated by catholic organisations and right to life associations and declared funding of 
€159,219. The third, ‘Stop Vivisection’, proposed the repeal of Directive 2010/63 on the 
protection of animals used for scientific purposes in order to phase out the practice of animal 
experimentation and received 1.17 million signatures. It was initiated by volunteers from the 
animal welfare sector and declared funding of €23,651 primarily from animal rights 
organisations.  
The organisers of these three initiatives were all received by the Commission to 
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explain their initiatives, prior to having public hearings organised at the European Parliament 
with representatives from both the Parliament and Commission, and followed by Commission 
communications explaining the action if any that it intended to take.102  We will briefly take 
each Communication in turn, but the general take home point has focussed on none having 
proposed legislative action. Much of the 13 page ‘Right2Water’ Communication had a self 
congratulatory feel to it in relation to EU action on access to water and sanitation. Although 
there was a seven bullet point summary of proposed action identified as directly relevant to 
the initiative and its goals, it was not clear whether these were a direct response to the 
initiative or part of a pre-existing agenda. Only one bullet point, a proposal to launch an EU-
wide public consultation on the Drinking Water Directive, looked directly related to potential 
legislative action. The Commission emphasised that its earlier proposal to exclude drinking 
water and certain waste water treatment from the EU’s new rules on concession contracts was 
a response to concerns raised by the Right2Water initiative.103 Accordingly where initiatives 
are receiving substantial popular support and tap into concerns with on-going legislative 
action they are even capable of having legislative impact during the signature gathering stage.  
Nonetheless, the Commission’s response has been criticised most notably in a 
European Parliament resolution on the follow-up to the initiative. 104 This 17 page resolution 
found the Commission response ‘insufficient’ and called for it ‘to come forward with 
legislative proposals’ while underscoring ‘that if the Commission neglects successful and 
widely supported ECIs…the EU as such will lose credibility in the eyes of citizens’. The 
Parliament is expressing the growing concern that the absence of legislative action for ECIs 
meeting the signature thresholds can damage support for the EU.  An eight page Commission 
response repeatedly underscored that it had ‘responded positively to the requests of the 
initiative’ and also that it was ‘not obliged to follow all the specific requests contained in a 
successful ECI’ (it is actually not obliged to follow any).105 The first initiative to meet the 
signature thresholds is already testament to an important potential dynamic that Dougan 
foresaw, namely, that representative democracy could be used to inflate the political value of 
a citizens’ initiative.106 In fact the Commission’s first published work programme since its 
response to that European Parliament resolution states that it will revise the Drinking Water 
Directive as a follow-up to the ‘Right2Water’ initiative (and a Regulatory Fitness and 
Performance Programme Evaluation).107 
The Commission’s response to the ‘One of Us’ initiative rejected the proposed 
legislative changes and emphasised that the Horizon 2020 provisions on human embryonic 
stem cell research had only very recently been agreed in a democratic process by the EU co-
legislator (European Parliament and Council).108 Given the recently adopted Horizon 2020 
Regulation it is unsurprising that the Parliament has not responded with a resolution directly 
chastising the Commission’s absence of follow-up as it had with the ‘Right2Water’ initiative. 
Surprisingly, the One of Us organisers brought a legal challenge on the basis that the 
Commission response was unsatisfactory and violated the democratic process as legal reasons 
were not provided for the refusal to transmit the proposal to the Parliament, and the 
Commission maintained a monopoly of the legislative process.109 These arguments have no 
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realistic chance of success because they are in direct tension with the ECI Regulation 
specifically requiring the Commission to set out ‘the action it intends to take, if any’ (Article 
10(1)(c)). Their additional plea that this provision of the Regulation should be annulled for 
breaching the Treaties is also far-fetched given the language in Article 11(4) TEU of ‘inviting 
the Commission’ which protects the Commission’s treaty-enshrined right of legislative 
initiative.110 Thus given the treaty and legislative text, judicial challenges to Commission 
communications responding to initiatives that meet the signature thresholds are unlikely to 
yield gains for citizens.  
Finally, the Commission response to the ‘Stop Vivisection’ initiative proposed a 
range of actions to accelerate the development and uptake of non-animal approaches in 
research and testing but none involved legislative action. The Commission underscored that it 
shared their conviction that animal testing should be phased out, while emphasising that 
Directive 2010/63 is an indispensable tool to protect animals and also ‘the catalyst for the 
development and uptake of alternative approaches, which is in line with the request of this 
Initiative’. The organisers brought a complaint to the Ombudsman which concluded that the 
Commission had ‘complied with its duty to explain, in a clear, comprehensible and detailed 
manner, its position and political choices’. 111	   
To conclude, the absence of legislative proposals has generated considerable 
consternation with the Commission and the ECI more generally. This is so despite the fact 
that agenda initiatives by their very nature are premised on requests and invitations to 
legislative action and in comparative terms rarely lead to concrete legislative output.  
However, in the EU set-up where democratic discontent has become increasingly profound, 
the absence or perceived absence of adequate follow-up to such initiatives is one of the perils 
of the ECI for the EU.  
 
D.	  The	  future	  of	  the	  ECI	  	  
 
Calls for ECI reform rapidly emerged and were effectively encouraged by Article 22 of the 
Regulation, entitled ‘Review’, which required the Commission to present a report on the 
operation of the Regulation to the European Parliament and the Council within three years. 112 
But no revision proposals were forthcoming in the eagerly anticipated review.113  The calls 
thus became louder and more critical, most significantly via a Parliamentary resolution in 
2015.114  The punch-line of the Commission’s detailed response was that it was ‘too early to 
launch a legislative revision’.115  Finally in April 2017 the Commission announced plans to 
revise the ECI to make it more accessible and citizen friendly with proposals expected in late 
2017.116  
Many of the long-circulating proposals have much to commend them.117 Chief among 
these include: increasing the period of time for collecting signatures whether that be to 18 or 
24 months given that we have seen that reaching the signature thresholds in 12 months is no 
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   and	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  a	  Revision	  of	  the	  European	  
Citizens’	  Initiative	  (European	  Parliament,	  2015).	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small feat; reducing the age for signing initiatives to 16, as is currently the case in Austria, 
thus encouraging greater youth involvement with the EU and facilitating meeting signature 
thresholds; harmonizing and reducing personal data requirements which deter citizens from 
signing initiatives; providing financial support for registered initiatives, and greater 
translation support, 118 given the considerable expenditure involved and with a view to making 
the ECI more accessible; stipulating that the personal liability of organisers  is not unlimited 
as the current phrasing in the Regulation discourages committee formation. 
Considerably more problematic are proposals for including treaty revision within the 
ECI’s remit or placing more duties on the Commission with respect to follow-up of 
initiatives.119 Amending the ECI Regulation to include treaty revision would, for reasons 
suggested above, be in tension with the Treaty text. But even if it were possible, it could have 
negative unforeseen consequences. Launching the treaty revision process has become a 
treacherous endeavor, not least because of Member State referendums. To expand the ECI to 
this terrain would generate unrealistic expectations as to its viability as a route to treaty 
change.  If achieving legislative change is a perceived measure of success and has proved 
both elusive thus far and a cause for discontent with the ECI, for its scope to be expanded to 
treaty revision creates the potential for more frustration and discontent. An alternative 
proposal to help manage expectations would be to expressly rule out treaty revision in the 
ECI Regulation itself. In relation to imposing obligations upon the Commission to actually 
produce legislative proposals this would be in clear tension with the Commission’s right of 
legislative initiative. The limited experience from the mere three to meet the signature 
thresholds provides insufficient basis for reconsidering the obligations on the Commission.  
 Inevitably with a novel and complex instrument there would be teething problems 
and scope for improvement. But we should not accept the increasingly standard line that 
portrays the first years of the ECI in a negative light with the Commission as the villain of the 
piece. There is an alternative more optimistic reading that is also more realistic in so far as it 
is shaped by awareness of agenda initiatives comparatively.  The ECI is a wholly novel 
transnational instrument that has generated considerable activity in its first five years with 
over 60 proposed initiatives. This has created interactions between EU citizens in diverse 
member states who have formed citizens committees, and others who may have tried 
unsuccessfully to do so. Registration refusals have been frequent, but this is not 
comparatively anomalous and was to be expected given the great complexity of the EU’s 
system of competences. Two significant exceptions aside – ‘Minority SafePack’ and ‘STOP 
TTIP’ – they have been unsurprising rejections and at least two were subsequently registered.  
From those registered, signed statements have exceeded 7 million (if one includes the ‘Stop 
Glyphosate’ initiative) which strengthens awareness of the ECI.  
The negative narrative flows partially from an impoverished definition of a 
‘successful initiative’ as either being confined to those meeting the signature thresholds, in 
line with the Commission’s own unfortunate labeling in the official register, or, worse still, 
those which have resulted in legislative action which would mean that none have been 
successful. It is too simplistic to see achieving the signature thresholds as the measure of 
success; this is a tall order even with the backing of civil society organisations. Even those 
not meeting the signature thresholds can be part of the promise of the ECI in that they foster 
its cross-national deliberative and participatory aspirations. Bouza Garcia and Greenwood 
have rightly emphasised the ECI’s value in generating proposals from activists well outside 
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  The	   EESC	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   the	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   Your	   Guide	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the ‘Brussels bubble’ and contributing to creating new pan-European networks and even new 
organisations.120 The European Ombudsman has also emphasised that a legislative proposal 
should not be seen as the only measure of success and that the process itself is of major 
significance.121  Indeed the importance of views being aired in the arena of the European 
Parliament, even absent legislative initiatives, should not be downplayed, and even initiatives 
not meeting the signature thresholds can be examined by the Parliament’s petitions committee 
if it considers follow-up appropriate.122  
Ultimately five years is very early days in the life of the first EU level direct 
democracy instrument. We can expect the revision process to result in an even more fit for 
purpose agenda initiative for the EU. But the ECI is in any event likely to become a powerful 
agenda initiative because of the political setting in which it is located. The EU’s political 
malaise and democratic disconnect vis-à-vis its citizens is such that there is enormous 
pressure to exploit all opportunities to combat this disconnect. And in an era where major 
treaty revision is no longer the order of the day, the existing treaty-enshrined instrument that 
is the ECI can make at least a modest contribution to addressing this disconnect. This promise 
of the ECI is dependent on political practice. If one type of political practice is seen to 
jeopardise the promise of the ECI, Commission reluctance to follow-up initiatives, there is 
scope for another type to contribute to that promise, namely, Parliament adding its weight, as 
it did with the ‘Right2Water’ initiative, to calls for action and if necessary backing initiatives 
via its own right to call for a legislative proposal. 123 In conclusion, the future of the ECI thus 
looks bright.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This concluding section begins by first focusing on the referendum device before moving on 
to the ECI. Throughout this paper we have flagged conditions under which the current 
practice of referendums on EU matters can be either perilous or promising for the EU. The 
fact that a referendum rejects a carefully negotiated treaty package is certainly not in and of 
itself a sufficient reason for denouncing the referendum device. After all, referendum 
outcomes are by their very nature uncertain in democratic regimes, a stark contrast to the 
staging of referendums in authoritarian regimes. 124  This line of argumentation against 
referendums -i.e. that the ‘people’ are not competent to understand the intricacies of 
contemporary policymaking- acquires an even greater resonance in the EU context in view of 
the latter's byzantine procedures and the sheer distance between ordinary citizens and 
Brussels. The competence justification is the classic argument against direct democracy and it 
appears in many guises in relation to referendums on EU matters.125 To our mind this is a 
misplaced critique against popular participation since, taken to its logical conclusion, a 
justification that is predicated on the faulty knowledge of citizens is an argument against 
democracy itself, including its representative variant. As Grynaviski has argued, empirical 
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  L	  Bouza Garcia and J Greenwood, ‘Bridging the Gap? Opportunities and Constraints of the European Citizens’ Initiative’, in 
M Conrad et al (eds) Bridging the Gap? Opportunities & Constraints of the European Citizens’ Initiative (Nomos 2016) 149. 	  
121	  See	  Decision	  of	  the	  European	  Ombudsman	  closing	  own-­‐initiative	  inquiry	  OI/9/2013/TN.	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  The	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   procedure	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  above,	  para	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   J	  Wheatley,	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   Disruptive	   Potential	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   Direct	   Democracy	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Divided	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  (ed),	  Direct	  Democracy	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  Minorities	  (Springer,	  2012).	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   line	  of	   argumentation	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  voters’	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  and	  EU	   referendums,	   see	  R	  Dehousse,	  
‘The	  Unmaking	  of	  a	  Constitution:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  European	  Referenda’	  (2006)	  13	  Constellations	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research over the past decades has, if anything, consistently revealed that voters are rather 
ignorant about the issues, candidate positions and party programmes associated with 
elections.126 Yet no one seriously advocates dispensing with elections because of faulty voter 
knowledge. From a voter competence perspective, in many respects the binary aspect of a 
referendum is easier to deal with than the multi-dimensional nature of an election. In short, 
opposition to direct democracy needs to draw its intellectual sustenance from arguments other 
than voter competence. 
No doubt in recognition of the need to go beyond simplistic voter competence 
critiques, one important line of research on EU referendums does not reject direct democracy 
outright but rather the dysfunctional way in which it is practiced in the EU context. Most 
commentary has focussed on treaty revision referendums. There are two main sources to the 
dysfunctional critique: (a) the extra-territorial spillover effects of referendums such as the 
treaty revision variant and (b) the discretionary way in which the referendum is deployed by 
political elites, often for gaining partisan advantage. To neutralise these problems scholars 
have advocated the introduction of pan-EU referendums as means to not only overcome the 
current pitfalls of EU referendums but more importantly to unleash the promise of direct 
democracy. The more promising variant seeks to overcome the unanimity hurdle so that the 
EU could no longer be held to ransom by the popular veto of a single member state nor be 
subjected to the partisan deployment of a referendum for strategic domestic political 
concerns. While we are sympathetic to the introduction of an appropriately configured pan-
EU referendum under some variant of a double majority system, we do not see this as 
politically feasible any time soon. 
In highlighting the promise and peril of referendums it is necessary to take account of 
the type of referendum in question. The most straightforward source of peril for the EU are 
those referendums that have a direct extraterritorial spillover – most of which are treaty 
revision referendums. Nonetheless, treaty revision referendums can certainly have redeeming 
features at the domestic level, especially when they are constitutionally mandatory rather than 
discretionary devices. However, from the EU level perspective they are mostly a perilous 
device.  Of all types, the membership referendum is the least perilous for the EU. This rather 
bold statement needs some further explication. Given the implications of joining the EU, a 
referendum can provide the highest degree of democratic legitimacy for acceding to the EU. 
Logically, the same argument can be run in reverse. Given the existence of an exit clause in 
the treaties, the referendum is an appropriate device for deciding on such a highly salient 
issue. Note that either decision (joining or leaving) could also be decided by holding a general 
election on the particular issue, with parties taking pro and contra positions. But then that 
election would be the functional equivalent of a referendum. The membership referendum is 
therefore not prima facie perilous for the EU. On the contrary, for deciding on the issues it 
touches upon the referendum is arguably the most appropriate device. This applies even to 
withdrawal referendums since the latter is one of two main mechanisms - the other being a 
general election on the specific issue - that can provide a constitutionally legitimate route to 
withdrawal. Evidently, if a major EU state or group of states deployed the withdrawal 
referendum this can be perilous for the EU and ultimately even lead to its unravelling. Yet, in 
any such instance the referendum is at best a symptom of the problem rather than its cause. 
The unraveling of the EU in the more extreme hypothetical scenario cannot be caused by the 
existence of the referendum device although it can be delivered by it. Instead, any putative 
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unraveling would be caused by a much deeper, and structural political malaise of the EU. A 
very different argument relates to the peril associated with the discretionary deployment of 
the referendum. The literature has, rightly, been very critical of discretionary referendums 
that are called for purely partisan motives referring to these as plebiscites or as power-
reinforcing and pro-hegemonic devices.127 A discretionary referendum can obviously be 
deployed on issues other than membership. However, the Brexit referendum provides a 
textbook example of such peril: an unnecessary referendum that was called mostly to resolve 
an internal party dispute. Thus our main problem with the Brexit referendum is not the 
referendum instrument per se but rather the strategic deployment of the device for partisan 
motives.  
In the case of the two remaining types we have shown conditions under which they 
are perilous for the EU independently of how they are called. The most controversial aspect 
of the EU’s direct democratic landscape was traditionally the treaty revision referendum. Its 
peril was always obvious given the unanimous ratification hurdle for a treaty to enter into 
force. And recourse to second referendums was required to allow three (Maastricht, Nice and 
Lisbon) of the last five major treaty revisions to enter into force. The existence of the popular 
veto point has been a key driver of calls for replacing the unanimous ratification hurdle,128 a 
view that was bolstered when the UK introduced ‘referendum locks’ on future treaty 
revisions. 129  With the UK’s departure following a withdrawal referendum, a type of 
referendum whose peril for the EU is now all too painfully apparent, this lock on future treaty 
revision will be no more. However, other Member States could mimic the UK locks and 
additional avenues for treaty revision referendums present themselves, notably the new Dutch 
citizen-initiated referendum. The treaty revision referendum will thus continue to make its 
presence felt, not necessarily because it will be activated but because its obvious peril for 
successful treaty revision discourages recourse to that route to constitutional adaptation. This 
in turn might lead to other EU related referendums, which brings us neatly to the policy 
referendum type. If, for example, ‘extra-EU agreements’ are used for constitutional 
adaptation they may find themselves subject to Member State referendums, as was the case 
with the Fiscal Compact in Ireland. Since such Agreements need not be wedded to unanimous 
ratification, the peril of a negative referendum vote could be contained.  States can thus retain 
the legitimacy gains they reap from having such a referendum, but without the same ability to 
externalise the consequences of a negative vote.  
The policy referendums category includes popular votes that cannot so easily be 
contained and we highlighted the disconcerting development of referendums by Member 
States on future enlargements. The new Dutch citizen-initiated referendum may be activated 
to this end and has already been applied, with hitherto unresolved implications, to another 
facet of the EU’s international relations, the ratification of an EU Agreement with a third 
state.  All is not bleak with regard to the policy referendum however. Some policy 
referendums can deliver a high degree of legitimacy and offer a promising route to the taking 
of salient political decision related to EU matters, such as the decision to join the Euro. 
Crucially, such decisions primarily affect the member state rather than the rest of the Union. 
In weaving together these various threads related to contemporary EU referendum 
practice we highlight two dimensions to the problematique. The first concerns the type of 
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referendum and, in particular, the degree of extraterritorial spillover generated by a given 
referendum. This varies from membership referendums, which mostly involve minimal 
spillover to other EU member states, to the treaty revision referendum and certain types of 
policy referendum that have a direct impact on the rest of the Union in a given policy domain. 
The second dimension relates to the discretion involved in calling for referendums in the first 
place. This continuum varies from constitutionally mandatory cases where political discretion 
is largely absent, those cases where referendums are politically obligatory though not 
necessarily constitutionally mandatory on issues of high salience, such as joining the EU or 
adopting the Euro, through to the unnecessary referendum called to resolve internal party 
disputes or to enhance the profile of a party leader or President. The latter type is the most 
suspect in terms of democratic legitimacy as pointed out in the literature.130 These two 
dimensions can interact in myriad ways. A discretionary referendum need not be perilous for 
the EU (as in the case when this has been the motive behind calling for an accession 
referendum). On the other hand, a democratically valid citizens initiative triggering a 
referendum (i.e. the Dutch Ukraine Agreement vote) or a court ruling to that effect (the Irish 
SEA referendum) can certainly be perilous for the EU.  
On balance the referendum is largely a perilous enterprise for the EU. To be fair, 
numerically speaking most EU referendums have actually been promising since accession 
referendums – which we believe are the most democratically apt devices for endorsing 
membership of the EU – account for the majority of referendum activity, while the perilous 
variant of the policy referendum is rather rare.131 Thus, although historically EU referendums 
may have on balance been mostly promising, the current trajectory –which includes the 
potential expansion of popular vetoes–  points in the direction of peril. A rather different 
picture crystalises in relation to the ECI, which is revealing of a fundamental dualism in 
relation to the impact of direct democracy instruments on EU affairs. On balance the picture 
is promising for ECI –which unlike the referendum is the only direct democratic instrument 
that is institutionalized at the EU level. Partly, because it does exist at EU level the 
dysfunctionality associated with the national referendums on EU matters has been overcome.  
There are a number of apparent perils with this instrument of direct democracy, concerns that 
upon closer inspection are mostly misguided.  
First, the democratic expectations regarding this instrument of direct democracy need 
to be re-calibrated to avoid disappointment. The ECI is an agenda initiative, which represents 
a careful balance between elements of direct democracy and representative democracy. Thus, 
the bold democratic rhetoric that has often accompanied the ECI needs to be managed. As 
powerful as the ECI could become by virtue of both design alterations and political practice, 
as long as it remains a species of agenda initiative, one of the weakest of direct democratic 
instruments, it will be beset by the agenda initiative’s inherent limitations. Crucially, this 
includes the fact that launching an initiative, as contrasted with simply supporting an existing 
initiative, is rarely likely to be within the reach of the ‘ordinary’ citizen; a problem 
accentuated in the EU set-up because the choice was legitimately made to impose a 
transnational prerequisite to launching an initiative, namely, a citizens’ committee composed 
of at least seven EU citizens resident in at least seven different Member States. The ECI 
should be evaluated according to the appropriate benchmark, i.e. as an instrument whose 
effects are largely mediated as opposed to the direct effect of a citizens' initiated referendum 
on a policy topic, which if approved, leads to direct policy change. A connected peril is that 
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the instrument’s potential is stifled because of choices in the implementing Regulation and 
the application of the admissibility test by the Commission. There have certainly been 
‘teething problems’, but reform is rightly on the agenda. However we have found the 
pessimistic narrative of existing outcomes under the ECI to be largely unsubstantiated and 
wedded to a reductionist (mis)understanding of success.   
A second potential peril of the ECI is that the ECI is used to block integrationist 
policy. Certain aspects of the EU’s future international relations not only now appear bound 
to be affected by Member State level direct democracy, but also by its own direct democracy 
instrument. We have seen the Commission conclude in its ‘STOP TTIP’ registration refusal 
that the ECI can be used to call for the conclusion of international agreements. The General 
Court’s STOP TTIP ruling held that it can also be used to call for negotiating mandates to be 
repealed and agreements not to be concluded which has enormous ramifications for potential 
involvement of citizens in the EU’s international relations. This is especially so if, as we 
suggest, the ECI becomes a powerful agenda initiative because of the considerable political 
pressure to exploit its promise. But what some of the political institutions, notably the 
Commission and the Council, might see as peril can, from the perspective of the citizenry 
more generally, be seen as democratic promise.  The ECI was introduced to open up new 
channels of political participation. To that end, it is likely to lead to policy proposals that both 
promote and oppose integrationist policy. This is a necessary attribute of a well-functioning 
democracy, i.e. to provide channels in which citizens can contest the direction of policy.  
Clarifying what type of institution the ECI is, represents a necessary first step to 
assessing its functioning and potential promise. Despite its institutional limitations, a well-
functioning agenda initiative can have significant indirect consequences in terms of putting 
issues on the policy agenda and in the EU case, mobilising citizenry and stimulating 
transnational debate. In rarer cases, an agenda initiative can also have a direct or partial policy 
impact on legislation. In its short history the ECI has already proved itself to be a valuable 
addition for the EU to engage with its citizens and for them to engage with each other even if 
it has not (yet) led to a concrete legislative output. The ECI’s promise far outweighs the peril 
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Table	  1:	  Membership	  referendums	  (22)	  
	  
Case	  &	  Year	   Turnout	   Yes	  
Vote	  
Result	   Issue	  
Denmark	  1972	   90.14	   63.39	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  European	  Community	  
Ireland	  1972	   70.88	   83.10	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  European	  Community	  
Norway	  1972	   79.22	   46.49	   Failed	   Accession	  to	  European	  Community	  
UK	  1975	   64.03	   67.23	   Passed	   Remaining	  in	  the	  European	  
Community	  




49.1	   73.64	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Austria	  1994	   82.35	   66.58	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Finland	  1994	   74	   56.89	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Norway	  1994	   89.04	   47.82	   Failed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Sweden	  1994	   83.32	   52.74	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Czech	  Republic	  
2003	  
55.21	   77.33	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Estonia	  2003	   64.06	   66.83	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Hungary	  2003	   45.62	   83.76	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Latvia	  2003	   72.53	   66.97	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Lithuania	  2003	   63.37	   91.07	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Malta	  2003	   90.86	   53.64	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Poland	  2003	   58.85	   77.45	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Romania	  2003	   55.7	   91.06	   Passed	   Constitutional	  Amendment	  for	  EU	  
Accession	  
Slovakia	  2003	   52.15	   93.71	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Slovenia	  2003	   60.41	   89.64	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
Croatia	  2012	   43.51	   66.27	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  the	  EU	  
UK	  2016	   72.2	   48.1	   Failed	   Remaining	  in	  the	  EU	  
	  
Source:	  Own	  elaboration	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Table	  2:	  Treaty	  revision	  referendums	  (16)	  
	  
Case	  &	  Year	   Turnout	   Yes	  Vote	   Result	   Issue	  
Denmark	  1986	   75.39	   56.24	   Passed	   Single	  European	  Act	  
Ireland	  1987	   44.09	   69.92	   Passed	   Single	  European	  Act	  
Denmark	  1992	   83.1	   49.29	   Failed	   Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  
France	  1992	   67.32	   51.04	   Passed	   Second	  Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  vote	  	  
Ireland	  1992	   57.31	   69.05	   Passed	   Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  
Denmark	  1993	   86.47	   56.73	   Passed	   Treaty	  of	  Maastricht	  
Denmark	  1998	   76.24	   55.1	   Passed	   Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  
Ireland	  1998	   56.2	   61.74	   Passed	   Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  
Ireland	  2001	   34.79	   46.13	   Failed	   Treaty	  of	  Nice	  
Ireland	  2002	   49.47	   62.89	   Passed	   Second	  Treaty	  of	  Nice	  vote	  
France	  2005	   69.37	   45.33	   Failed	   Constitutional	  Treaty	  	  
Luxembourg	  2005	   55.7	   56.52	   Passed	   Constitutional	  Treaty	  
Netherlands	  2005	   63.3	   38.46	   Failed	   Constitutional	  Treaty	  
Spain	  2005	   41.77	   76.96	   Passed	   Constitutional	  Treaty	  
Ireland	  2008	   53.13	   46.6	   Failed	   Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  
Ireland	  2009	   59	   67.13	   Passed	   Second	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  vote	  
	  





Table	  3:	  Policy	  referendums	  	  (10)	  
	  
Case	  &	  Year	   Turnout	   Yes	  Vote	   Result	   Issue	  
France1972	  	   60.24	   68.32	   Passed	   Enlargement	  of	  European	  Community	  




87.59	   46.79	   Failed	   Adopting	  the	  Euro	  
Sweden	  
2003	  
82.56	   42.01	   Failed	   Adopting	  the	  Euro	  
Ireland	  
2012	  
50.53	   60.37	   Passed	   Fiscal	  Compact	  Treaty	  
Denmark	  
2014	  
55.85	   62.47	   Passed	   Accession	  to	  Unified	  Patent	  Court	  	  
Greece	  
2015	  
62.5	   38.69	   Failed	   Bailout	  package	  
Denmark	  
2015	  
72	   46.89	   Failed	   Opting	  in	  to	  certain	  JHA	  issues	  
Netherlands	  
2016	  
32.28	   38.21	   Failed	   EU-­‐Ukraine	  Association	  Agreement	  
Hungary	  
2016	  
44.04	   1.64	   Failed	   Hungarian	  refugee	  quota	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Table	  4:	  ECI	  Outcomes	  (April	  2012-­‐April	  2017)	  	  	  
	  
Status	  	   Number	   Percent	  
Refused	  registration	  	   20	   32	  
Registered	  	   43	   68	  
Total	   63	   100	  
	   	   	  
Registered	  initiatives	   	   	  
Met	  1	  million	  threshold	   3	   7	  
Collection	  ongoing	  	   6	   14	  
Insufficient	  support	   18	   42	  
Withdrawn	  	   14	   32	  
Collection	  closed	   2	   5	  
Total	  registered	   43	   100	  
	  





















Source:	  Eurobarometer	  85	  (2016):	  Question	  asked:	  In	  general,	  does	  the	  EU	  conjure	  
up	  for	  you	  a	  very	  positive,	  fairly	  positive,	  neutral,	  fairly	  negative	  or	  very	  negative	  
image?	  (%	  -­‐	  EU)	  
 
	  
